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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
power cannot constitutionally be delegated to the Congress
beyond the mark established in Katchen and Atlas. '19
Ross F. PLAETZER
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Double Jeopardy-Double
Jeopardy Clause Not Offended by Appeal of Dismissal on
Defendant's Motion if Dismissal Requires No Determina-
tion of Guilt. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
Until 1970 the government's right to appeal a criminal case was
limited by a number of jurisdictional provisions which greatly
reduced the need to decide issues regarding the government's
right to appeal on constitutional grounds.' However, the Omni-
bus Crime Control Act of 19702 eliminated these jurisdictional
restrictions and allowed government appeals of decisions, judg-
ments and orders except "where the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution3 prohibits further prosecu-
tion."4 Since 1971 there has been a resurgence of interest in the
double jeopardy protection as a result of this change, and a
number of Supreme Court cases have focused specifically upon
its scope.5
These and earlier cases interpreting the clause have gener-
ally held that acquittals are not appealable by the government
while, absent prosecutorial misconduct or judicial overreach-
ing, mistrials generally are appealable.6 Problems in interpret-
ing the scope of the clause arise, however, in instances of dis-
missals which can be characterized neither as mistrials nor as
acquittals. The general rule which had been followed in such
119. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 655 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (forcefully stating the "preservation" aspect of the seventh amendment).
1. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V reads in part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (footnote added).
5. See, e.g., Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.
28 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497 (1978); United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
6. See text accompanying notes 27-55 infra.
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cases was that appeal is barred where retrial would result upon
remand should the government prevail upon appeal.' Such was
the rule specifically relied upon by the seven member majority8
in United States v. Jenkins,9 a 1975 decision authored by Jus-
tice Rehnquist. In United States v. Scott,'0 a 1978 decision also
authored by Justice Rehnquist, Jenkins is specifically over-
ruled." The five member Scott majority' 2 now holds that it does
not offend the double jeopardy clause to subject an accused to
a second trial on a criminal count which had been dismissed
on his own motion at the close of the evidence, if such dismissal
requires no determination of factual guilt or innocence. Follow-
ing Scott, the dispositive issue in determining whether the dou-
ble jeopardy clause is offended by a government appeal, is not
whether retrial will result on remand, but rather whether a
motion to dismiss was made by the defendant without submis-
sion to the factfinder of the question of guilt or innocence.' 3
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PROTECTION
A. The Early Precedent
Although the roots of double jeopardy can be traced to an-
cient Greece and Rome," its development in English law ma-
tured only after prosecutions for criminal violations became a
function of the state. Blackstone wrote that the pleas of former
acquittal and former conviction were both valid defenses.
These special pleas in bar were based on matters not apparent
on the face of the charging document and went to the merits
of a subsequent indictment. The principle of "jeopardy," ap-
plicable to both pleas, was grounded on the "universal maxim
7. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
8. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majoiity opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Douglas filed
a concurring opinion in which Justice Brennan joined.
9. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
10. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
11. Id. at 87.
12. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices White, Marshall and Stevens joined.
13. 437 U.S. at 101.
14. See 1 DEMOSTHENES AGAINST ARISTOGEITON 589 (Vince trans. 1962); 11 S. ScoTr,
THE CmWL LAw 17 (1932). An indepth analysis of the history of the double jeopardy
clause can be found in United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). See also L. MILLER,
DouBnE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDEA SYSTEM (1968).
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of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence."'"
English law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
however, held that nothing short of a final judgment would bar
further prosecution. 6
B. Jurisdictional Considerations
The first Supreme Court case to deal with the government's
right to appeal, United States v. Sanges,"7 distinguished
common-law restrictions on the right to appeal from constitu-
tional restrictions. Relying on state court decisions, it held that
absent clear statutory authorization, the government had no
right to appeal in "a criminal case of any grade after judgment
below in favor of the defendant."'18 While Congress conferred
jurisdiction for appeals in the first Criminal Appeals Act of
1907,11 the jurisdictional grant both as originally and subse-
quently0 enacted was limited. In 1970 this provision was re-
placed by the Criminal Appeals Act, a part of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act.21 According to Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority in United States v. Wilson,2 the legislative history
of the Appeals Act made it clear that Congress intended to
remove all statutory barriers to government appeals and allow
them whenever the Constitution would permit.2 The relevant
statutory language now reads:
15. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTFARES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 1019 (Chase ed. 1890).
16. In the course of ratification proceedings, representatives of Maryland and New
York suggested that a double jeopardy clause be included in the first amendments. As
a result, James Madison proposed such a clause that failed to survive the Senate,
which chose language that had greater similarity to Blackstone's statement of the
jeopardy principles. In relevant part, the version adopted by the Senate read as follows,
"nor shall any person be subject to be put in jeopardy of life or limb, for the same
offence." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 77,434 (1789) (Gales & Seaton ed. 1849).
17. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
18. Id. at 323.
19. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, provided in pertinent part that an
appeal could be taken by the United States in all criminal cases "[firom the decision
or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in
jeopardy."
20. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 844; Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, § 1, 56
Stat. 271; Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54.
21. See note 2 supra. The recent amendments of the Omnibus Act were not consid-
ered to be controversial by the Senate and it was felt that the legislation posed no
threat to the constitutional rights of defendants, but did rectify jurisdictional problems
which the government faced in criminal appeals. 116 CONG. Rac. 35659-60 (1970).
22. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
23. Id. at 337.
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In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall
lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order
of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as
to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie
where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Consti-
tution prohibits further prosecution.24
Once Congress removed the statutory limitations to appeal and
the relevant inquiry turned on the reach of the double jeopardy
clause itself, it became "necessary to take a closer look at the
policies underlying the Clause." 25 This closer look has resulted
in eight Supreme Court double jeopardy decisions in the last
term alone.2"
II. THE MEANING OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE MISTRIAL AND THE
ACQUITTAL CONTEXTS
A. In the Mistrial Context
Since United States v. Perez,27 retrial after mistrial has of-
tentimes been allowed regardless of whether the mistrial was
declared in response to a motion of the defendant or a motion
of the court. Nevertheless, the tests as to the permissibility of
retrial vary depending upon the position of the party who
makes the mistrial motion. In Perez, the trial judge had made
a discretionary declaration of mistrial after the jury was unable
to reach a verdict. The Court concluded that double jeopardy
does not bar retrial where the trial judge, after "taking all the
circumstances into consideration," decides that "there is a
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice
would otherwise be defeated. ' 28 The Perez holding was af-
firmed as late as 1976 in United States v. Sanford.29 Sanford
also involved a declaration of mistrial because a jury was un-
able to reach a verdict. During the government's preparations
to reprosecute, the district court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss. While the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dis-
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
25. 420 U.S. at 339.
26. See note 5 supra.
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 194 (1824).
28. Id. at 194. The Perez Court emphasized the limited scope of this exception by
adding, "To be sure, the power [to declare a mistrial and subject the defendant to
retrial] ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and
for very plain and obvious causes. . . ." Id. See generally 26 RurTGERS L. REV. 682
(1973); 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453 (1972).
29. 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
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missed the government's appeal on double jeopardy grounds,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's dismissal ob-
serving that the trial court's act met the manifest necessity test
of Perez.
On the other hand, if a mistrial is declared sua sponte in
the absence of manifest necessity as discussed in United States
u. Jorn,30 the double jeopardy clause sometimes does afford
protection. Jorn involved a charge of willfully assisting in the
preparation of fraudulent tax returns. After the jury had been
impaneled, the government called a taxpayer witness whom
Jorn had allegedly aided. Learning that warnings to this and
all other government witnesses had been given only by the
Internal Revenue Service and that none had counsel, the trial
court discharged the jury and aborted the trial sua sponte in
order to permit the witnesses to obtain legal advice. Prior to the
new trial, Jorn successfully moved for dismissal on grounds of
former jeopardy and, upon direct appeal by the government to
the Supreme Court, the dismissal was affirmed. The Jorn
Court concluded that the trial judge had abused his discretion,
thereby failing to meet the manifest necessity test of Perez.3 1
In contrast to Perez, Sanford and Jorn, the situation in
United States v. Dinitz2 involved the declaration of a mistrial
on motion of the defendant. Dinitz held that, absent bad faith
conduct by the court or prosecution intended to provoke a
mistrial request or harass or prejudice the defendant, the dou-
ble jeopardy clause does not bar retrial in such circumstances.33
In Dinitz, defendant's chief counsel was expelled from court
during his opening statement. After the court had given the
defendant several options as to when and how the trial would
proceed, he chose to move for a mistrial to allow himself time
to obtain new counsel. Prior to his second trial, the defendant's
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was denied.
Subsequently, he represented himself and was convicted. The
30. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
31. Id. at 487. Cf. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (where retrial was
constitutionally permissible even though the judge's declaration of mistrial had been
overcautious and premature). See generally Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125
U. PA. L. Rav. 449 (1977).
32. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
33. Id. at 606, 611. The Court described the circumstance as judicial "error," with-
out further elaboration and stated that only if error occurred in bad faith was retrial
barred, citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion) and
Downum v. United States, 373 U.S. 734 (1963). It should be noted that in Dinitz both
parties and the bench clearly contemplated retrial.
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Fifth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court reinstated the
conviction emphasizing the limited double jeopardy protection
afforded where a mistrial has been declared at defendant's re-
quest:
The distinction between mistrials declared by the court
sua sponte and mistrials granted at the defendant's request
or with his consent is wholly consistent with the protections
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even when judicial or prose-
cutorial error prejudices a defendant's prospects of securing
an acquittal, he may nonetheless desire "to go to the first jury
and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquit-
tal.". . . Our prior decisions recognize the defendant's right
to pursue this course in the absence of circumstances of mani-
fest necessity requiring a sua sponte judicial declaration of
mistrial. But it is evident that when judicial or prosecutorial
error seriously prejudices a defendant, he may have little
interest in completing the trial and obtaining a verdict from
the first jury. The defendant may reasonably conclude that
a continuation of the tainted proceeding would result in a
conviction followed by a lengthy appeal and, if a reversal is
secured, by a second prosecution. In such circumstances, a
defendant's mistrial request has objectives not unlike the in-
terests served by the Double Jeopardy Clause-the avoidance
of the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple
prosecutions.u
Thus, a defendant who moved for mistrial because of error
during trial can be retried if the mistrial has not been required
by judicial or prosecutorial conduct constituting bad faith.3
In Lee v. United States,3" the Court considered the issue of
whether the denomination of a decision as a mistrial or a dis-
missal was of critical significance. It concluded that it was not:
The distinction . . . does not turn on whether the Dis-
trict Court labels its action a "dismissal" or a "declaration
of mistrial." The critical question is whether the order con-
templates an end to all prosecution of the defendant for the
34. 424 U.S. at 608.
35. Other types of situations where retrial was not barred upon mistrial occurred
in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (military court martial discharged due to
tactical necessities in the field); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (jury
discharged where one juror had served on grand jury indicting defendant); Logan v.
United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (jury discharged for inability to reach a verdict after
forty hours of deliberation); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (letter
published in newspaper rendered juror's impartiality doubtful).
36. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
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offense charged. A mistrial ruling invariably rests on grounds
consistent with reprosecution . . while a dismissal may or
may not do soy
In Lee, immediately after the prosecutor's opening statement,
counsel for the defendant moved for dismissal on the ground
that the information failed to allege all of the statutory requi-
sites. It is noteworthy that the defense had made no pretrial
motion to this effect. At the close of the evidence, the trial
judge granted the motion even though he thought that the
defendant's guilt had been proven beyond any reasonable
doubt. Because the proceedings were not "terminate[d] . . .
in the defendant's favor" 3 and the defective information did
not constitute bad faith conduct by the prosecution, the Court
upheld Lee's retrial, describing the dismissal of his original
trial as "functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of
mistrial."3
Clearly, the term "mistrial" in its usual context relates to
a device employed when uncontrollable and unforeseen cir-
cumstances preclude trial before a given factfinder in the bal-
anced and fair framework anticipated by the parties. In such
instances, since termination arises because of procedural prob-
lems rather than as a result of determinations regarding gen-
eral issues of the case, it is felt that it is neither unreasonable
nor unfair to subject the accused to a second trial. Implicit in
this view is the assumption that, while the accused has an
interest in having a final decision from the initial tribunal, this
interest must be weighed against the public's right to retribu-
tion.4o
B. In the Acquittal Context
"Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of dou-
ble jeopardy jurisprudence has been that '[a] verdict of ac-
quittal. . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, with-
37. Id. at 30.
38. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975) (contrasts proceedings
terminating with mistrial with proceedings terminating in the defendant's favor).
39. 432 U.S. at 31 (footnote omitted).
40. It is interesting to note that it is this balancing test-the defendant's right to
trial by initial tribunal versus public's right to retribution which is referred to through-
out the majority opinion. The dissent, on the other hand, refers to the balancing of
the government's right to have one full opportunity to convict against the defendant's
right to avoid the anxiety of multiple prosecutions. The choice of values to be balanced,
of course, reflects the interest which the parties see the double jeopardy clause as
designed to protect. See text accompanying notes 45-55 & 84-85 infra.
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out putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby vio-
lating the Constitution.'"41 The Supreme Court has refused,
however, to be bound by terminology, in the acquittal, as in the
mistrial context, and, in determining whether there has been
an acquittal, it had directed that a court ought not to be con-
trolled by the form of the judge's action. 2
The analysis to be utilized in making the decision whether
a ruling, for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause, had the
characteristics of an acquittal was developed in United States
v. Sisson 3 and Serfass v. United States" as discussed below.
That test, in turn, was grounded not in technical distinctions
between motions, but rather in what was considered to be the
basic purpose of the double jeopardy clause itself:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continu-
ing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.45
Viewed from this standpoint the question became whether the
state had been given a full chance to convict in the first trial.
The measure of whether there had been a full chance to convict
turned upon whether the dismissal was based on facts brought
out at trial. This wording, in fact grew out of Sisson, a pre-1971
case which it should be noted, rests on an interpretation of
statutory wording, and made no reference to the double jeop-
ardy clause itself. Sisson, the defendant, moved for arrest of
judgment after the jury had found him guilty of willfully failing
to report for induction. While the arrest of judgment motion
41. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
42. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470 (1971); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). See generally 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PNOB. 295
(1970); 87 HARV. L. REV. 1822 (1974).
43. 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
44. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
45. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See also Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519 (1975); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
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was jurisdictional, it can be argued that the trial court's opin-
ion did not go to the jurisdictional question but rather went to
the willfulness of the act. On review, the Court held that be-
cause the disposition below was based on facts inferred by the
court "on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial"46 rather
than a flawed indictment, the decision amounted to a directed
acquittal, and the jurisdictional requirements of the Appeals
Act were not met.4' The Court in Serfass cited Sisson to the
effect that the order of the district court was a legal determina-
tion on the basis of facts brought out at trial relating to the
general issue of the case. 4 Thus, Sisson and Serfass held that,
if the trial judge's action in terminating the trial was based on
facts adduced at trial, and not merely on facts found on the
face of the indictment or information, the termination had the
effect of an acquittal.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.49 was a criminal
contempt case where a judgment of acquittal, entered upon a
Rule 29(c) motion, 5 was made after the discharge of a dead-
locked jury. The trial judge had determined that the evidence
was legally insufficient to sustain conviction. Since this ruling
was based on evidence adduced at trial that went to the general
46. 399 U.S. at 288.
47. The Court noted that:
Thus, three requirements must be met for this Court to have jurisdiction
under this provision. First, the decision of the District Court must be one
"arresting a judgment of conviction." Second, the arrest of judgment must be
for the "insufficiency of the indictment or information." And third, the decision
must be "based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which
the indictment or information is founded."
Because the District Court's decision rests on facts not alleged in the indict-
ment but instead inferred by the court from the evidence adduced at trial, we
conclude that neither the first nor second requirement is met.
399 U.S. at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
48. 420 U.S. at 393.
49. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
50. FR. R. CrM. P. 29(c) states:
(c) Motion After Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty
or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of
acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a
verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict
and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may enter
judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion
that a similar motion has been made prior to the submission of the case to the
jury.
Guidelines for use of the rule are found in 4A L. FRumER & I. HAxLL, BENDER's FEDERAL
PRAcnca FORMS 56 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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issue of the case, the Court reasoned that the acquittal fell
squarely within the language of Sisson and Serfass, thus bar-
ring review.5'
The rule of law enunciated in United States v. Wilson.2 is
also grounded in a recognition that the purpose of the double
jeopardy provision is to bar second prosecutions. In Wilson, it
was held that appeal of a post verdict dismissal did not offend
the fifth amendment since a new trial would not be necessary
should the government prevail upon appeal. The sole test of
constitutionality in instances where the government had had
one full chance to try the defendant and failed, is, according
to Wilson, the necessity upon remand of a new trial amounting
to a harassing multiple prosecution. 3
United States v. Jenkins,54 decided the same day as Wilson,
relies on the *Wilson test in its finding that the double jeopardy
clause is offended by appeal following dismissal on motion of
the defendant at the close of the evidence. Jenkins was charged
with knowingly refusing to submit to induction on February 24,
1971. After receiving the notice to report, he had applied for
conscientious objector status but he did not receive a response
to this application prior to his reporting date. Though as of that
date the law of the circuit, as enunciated in United States v.
Gearey,5 5 required that a local draft board reopen an individ-
ual's classification in such instances, this position was subse-
quently overruled by the Supreme Court. At the time of Jen-
kin's trial, Gearey did not govern.
Jenkins had filed a pretrial motion for dismissal based on
Gearey which was denied. However, at the close of the evi-
dence, the trial court dismissed the indictment holding that
equity would be offended if the defendant were convicted for
acting in compliance with, what at the time of his act, was
51. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion in Martin Linen Supply, reasoned that
appeal was barred because the plain language of the act authorized appeals only from
dismissals, not from acquittals. 430 U.S. at 577. He also traced the legislative history
of the statute and noted that while the Senate bill authorized appeal from any decision
or order "terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant," the enacted Conference
Committee version deleted this portion, leaving only dismissals appealable. Since
acquittal was omitted from the list of actions appealable, Stevens concluded that there
could be no government appeal of this case.
52. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
53. Id. at 352.
54. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
55. 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966).
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controlling law. United States v. Scott involved a trial court
holding made in an almost identical procedural context.
]I. THE Scott DECISION
John Arthur Scott was an undercover officer for the Central
Narcotics Unit of Muskegon County, Michigan, who was ar-
rested on January 22, 1975, for selling narcotics to a paid in-
formant in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 5 An alleged sale
on September 24, 1974, served as the basis of count II of the
indictment which was returned on March 5, 1975, and an al-
leged sale on January 22, 1975, served as the basis of count Ill.
The grand jury also added a third count, count I, alleging a sale
of narcotics September 20, 1974.51 Prior to trial, Scott filed a
motion to dismiss counts I and II because of pre-indictment
delay. The court denied the motion without prejudice. The
motion was renewed and denied at the conclusion of the gov-
ernment's case, and again renewed at the close of all the evi-
dence. At that time the district court ruled on the motion and
dismissed counts I and H. 5. Mr. Scott was acquitted by the jury
56. (1970). The statute provides in part:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ....
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
57. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
58. Although the decision to dismiss count I was clearly based on intentional,
prejudicial pre-indictment delay, the court's reasons for dismissing count II are less
clear. The trial judge noted:
I do not decide whether the degree of prejudice shown here would be suffi-
cient for dismissal if the reason for delay was neutral. I hold only that since the
delay resulted primarily from an attempt to gain a tactical advantage, this
Defendant has presented sufficient proof of prejudice with respect to Count I.
I am still a little concerned about September 24th because of some of the
totalities of the circumstances in this case. Here is a black officer, the only black
officer ever to serve in the unit. He was denied help when again and again he
asked for help. That is a jungle out there. The Defendant's theory is that he was
left alone, and being left alone he had to devise his own means of surviving in
that jungle, and that he was in the process of trying to eliminate what he
contended was a big operator, the Government's informant Jordan.
There is evidence in the record from which the jury can conclude that the
Defendant's evidence was correct.
One of the problems is, in this case, as I see it, is the very heavy burden which
the Defendant had to carry when he was in that jungle; And what-here was
an officer. He was brought up from the patrol and tossed into the thicket of a
highly sophisticated area of activities. And of all of the things he had to try to
1978]
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as to count III. The government appealed the dismissal of
counts I and II to the Sixth Circuit 9 which denied the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction." The government then sought certiorari
for its appeal of the dismissal of count 1.1
The majority opinion in Scott is difficult to analyze for, in
this author's view, it does not evidence the characteristics of
serious and principled adjudication. Marred by miscitation of
authority 2 and based upon a questionable analogy,63 Scott con-
cluded by offering a test which-if honestly applied to the facts
before it-could'easily have resulted in a contrary holding. The
Court began by acknowledging that the decision to overrule
Jenkins stemmed from policy considerations:
If Jenkins is a correct statement of the law, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals relying on that decision, as it was
remember in that kind of a circumstance he may have forgotten crucial testi-
mony essential to his defense.
I am going to dismiss Count H, as well.
I am not setting a precedent in that regard. I am doing it solely out of the
peculiar circumstances of this case. The defendant in this case should not have
been out there in that jungle alone. And what I am concerned about is a compro-
mise verdict which may result if he were to be-had to stand trial all the way
on the three counts.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, app. D, at 8a-10a. See text accompanying notes 79-
81 infra.
59. The appeal was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
60. 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1976).
61. The government chose not to appeal the dismissal of count II but did "not
concede ... that a second trial on count II would have violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause." Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.4. It chose not to appeal the dismissal of count II
because of the lack of clarity surrounding that dismissal. Id. Following remand, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss counts I and II. Letter
from Attorney William C. Marietti, Muskegon, Michigan, counsel for Scott, to Larry
L. Shupe (August 11, 1978).
62. E.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) is cited in support of the
proposition that "[s]uccessful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any ground
other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict ... poses no bar
to further prosecution .... Scott, 437 U.S. at 90-91. Burks, in fact, did not define
the set of all appeals that did not offend double jeopardy, but only defined one instance
when the clause is offended: after successful appeal by a defendant, the "Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evi-
dence legally insufficient." Burks, 437 U.S. at 18. Again the opinion cites Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978), as the basis of a fundamental postulate of its reasoning,
that is that "[tlhe primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to protect the
integrity of a final judgment. . . ." Scott, 437 U.S. at 92. In fact, while Crist recog-
nizes that "a primary purpose" of the Clause is to protect finality of judgment, it
recognizes that "[t]he basic reason for holding that defendant is not in jeopardy" is
the Green rationale, the basic unfairness of multiple uses of the state's extensive
resources against a single individual. Crist, 437 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added).
63. See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
[Vol. 62:289
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
bound to do, would in all likelihood have to be affirmed. Yet,
though our assessment of the history and meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass v.
United States. . .occurred only three Terms ago, our vastly
increased exposure to the various facets of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause has now convinced us that Jenkins was wrongly
decided. It placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the
defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first-jury
empaneled to try him. .... .1
The opinion then moves to the core of its reasoning: that the
dismissal of the indictment in Scott because of pre-indictment
delay was more akin to a declaration of mistrial than to an
acquittal.
Unfortunately, the Scott dismissal did not have any of the
characteristics of a declaration of mistrial. Not only did it not
result from procedural issues, but also, at the time of dismissal,
there could have been no contemplation of a second prosecu-
tion. Scott relied on Downum v. United States65 for support of
its position that, "The fact that the trial judge contemplates
that there will be a new trial is not conclusive on the issue of
double jeopardy. . . 6 However, the Court neglected to point
out that the trial court's conclusions as to reprosecution had
been decisive in all instances except where the trial court had
erred in the prosecution's favor-in cases such as Jorn where
the judge had abused his discretion in declaring a mistrial sua
sponte.
The Court's willingness to equate the Scott dismissal with
a declaration of mistrial stems, it seems, from a generally nega-
tive view of the protections afforded criminal defendants as a
result of relatively recent decisions of the Court: "Part of the
difficulty arises from the development of other protections for
criminal defendants in the years since the adoption of the Bill
of Rights."87 Thus any actions by defendants designed to take
advantage of these protections are denominated "situations in
which the defendant is responsible for the second prosecu-
tion."' They become equated with motions for mistrial made
by a defendant and then the onus for the retrial is transferred
64. 437 U.S. at 86-87.
65. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
66. 437 U.S. at 92.
67. Id. at 87-88.
68. Id. at 96.
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from the government to the defendant and made to appear his
deliberate choice.
Once this shift of definition has been made, the Court can
substitute a new test which is constructed from language found
in Martin Linen Supply. Prior to Scott, Wilson had held that
if retrial would not be required upon remand of a successful
government appeal, the double jeopardy clause would not be
offended. On the other hand, as in Jenkins, if successful appeal
on reversal would require "further proceedings of some sort,
devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements
of the offense charged," such appeal would be barred.69
Martin Linen Supply had utilized two phrases to define
acquittal: the traditional definition utilized in Serfass and
Sisson-" 'a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced
at trial relating to the general issue of the case' " 70 -and the
more narrow definition "a resolution, [in the defendant's
favor] correct or not, or some or all of the factual elements of
the offense charged." 7' According to Justice Brennan, author of
the Martin Linen Supply decision,
[The latter] definition, which is narrower than the tradi-
tional one, enjoys no significant support in our prior deci-
sions. The language quoted from Martin Linen Supply Co.
was tied to the particular issue in that case and was never
intended to serve as an all-encompassing definition of acquit-
tal for all purposes. Rather, Martin Linen Supply referred
generally to "acquittal" as "a legal determination on the
basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue
of the case. ' 7
Nevertheless, the Scott Court builds on the narrower defini-
tion, and, since in the majority's view, the district court had
not resolved any factual elements in the defendant's favor, the
dismissal could not be deemed an acquittal. The problem, of
course, is in determining whether factual elements had been
resolved. The majority holds that defenses such as insanity or
entrapment go to factual elements of the offense charged while
defenses such as pre-indictment delay do not.73 The dissent
finds the majority's distinctions "incapable of principled appli-
69. 420 U.S. at 370.
70. 430 U.S. at 575 (quoting Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. at 393).
71. 430 U.S. at 571.
72. 437 U.S. at 111-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. at 575).
73. 437 U.S. at 97-98.
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cation." 74 In Scott, Justice Rehnquist dismissed the dissent's
concern that in trials to the court, no clear line can be drawn
between decisions relating to factual elements going to guilt or
innocence and purely legal determinations.15 However, in
Jenkins, he himself had voiced that concern:
A general finding of guilt by a judge may be analogized
to a verdict of "guilty" returned by a jury .... In a case
tried to a jury, the distinction between the jury's verdict of
guilty and the court's ruling on questions of law is easily
perceived. In a bench trial, both functions are combined in
the judge, and a general finding of "not guilty" may rest
either on the determination of facts in favor of a defendant
or on the resolution of a legal question favorably to him ...
We are less certain than the Government, however, of the
basis upon which the District Court ruled. It is, to be sure,
not clear that the District Court resolved issues of fact in
favor of respondent. But neither is it clear, to us that the
District Court, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
expressly or even impliedly found against respondent on all
the issues necessary to establish guilt under even the Govern-
ment's formulation of the applicable law.7"
Given the confusion surrounding the dismissal of counts I and
II, it remains unclear whether the granting of Scott's motion
of dismissal based on pre-indictment delay actually did involve
the resolution of factual issues in the trial judge's mind or
whether it actually did involve questions concerning the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.
The defense of pre-indictment delay is of particular impor-
tance in cases, such as drug cases, when there is limited tangi-
ble evidence and the only defense available involves contradic-
tion of the state's witnesses' testimony. 7 Since few people can
recall the details of their conduct on a particular day six
months or twelve months earlier, their defense is particularly
prejudiced by prosecutorial postponement of the indictment.
In a concurring opinion in United States v. Marion" an early
understanding of the pre-indictment delay defense was cited:
74. Id. at 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 98 n.11.
76. 420 U.S. at 366-67 (footnotes omitted).
77. While prosecutorial delays occurring after criminal charges are filed implicate
the right to a prompt trial under the sixth amendment, delays prior to charging gener-
ally involve due process under the fifth amendment. See generally United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
78. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
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"It is monstrous to put a man on his trial after such a lapse
of time. How can he account for his conduct so far back? If
you accuse a man of a crime the next day, he may be enabled
to bring forward his servants and family to say where he was
and what he was about at the time; but if the charge be not
preferred for a year or more, how can he clear himself? No
man's life would be safe if such a prosecution were permitted.
It would be very unjust to put him on his trial."7
Scott is an excellent example of the multiple considerations
involved in a decision to dismiss on the basis of pre-indictment
delay. As the defense attempted to bring out and as the trial
judge noted, Scott was the only black officer ever to serve on
this particular narcotics unit. He was brought up from patrol
and given no particular training for this work either in terms
of recordkeeping or with respect to the boundaries of behavior
appropriate in these circumstances. Although Scott sought as-
sistance and advice on many occasions, he was consistently
denied it. He was then brought to trial for sale of narcotics on
the basis of the testimony of an informer against whom he was
a primary witness in an upcoming state trial. The trial judge's
decision to dismiss does not appear to have been an abstract
"legal judgment that a defendant, although criminally culpa-
ble, may not be punished because of a supposed constitutional
violation."8 Rather it appears to have involved the finding of
a constitutional violation which was a violation because it im-
pacted both on the defendant's ability to challenge the suffi-
ciency of the prosecution's evidence and his ability to demon-
strate possibly "legally adequate justification for otherwise
criminal acts."8' A further serious criticism of the Scott deci-
sion is that it creates an artificial distinction between defenses.
As stated by Justice Brennan:
The whole premise for today's retreat from Jenkins and
Lee, of course, is the Court's new theory that a criminal de-
fendant who seeks to avoid conviction on a "ground unrelated
to factual innocence" somehow stands on a different constitu-
tional footing than a defendant whose participation in his
criminal trial creates a situation in which a judgment of ac-
79. Id. at 328-29 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Regina v. Robins, 1 Cox's C.C.
114 (Somerset Winter Assizes 1844)).
80. 437 U.S. at 98 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted). This is the language which the majority used
to describe the defenses of entrapment and insanity and to distinguish these defenses
from that of pre-indictment delay.
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quittal has to be entered. This premise is simply untena-
ble....
It is manifest that the reasons that bar a retrial following
an acquittal are equally applicable to a final judgment en-
tered on a ground "unrelated to factual innocence." The
heavy personal strain of the second trial is the same in either
case. So too is the risk that, though innocent, the defendant
may be found guilty at a second trial.82
The practical consequences of Scott may well be that courts
will have to struggle with its requirement of "true acquittal."
This, in turn, could easily produce rather strained interpreta-
tions that inevitably decrease the scope of double jeopardy
protection for an increasing number of defendants.
And, it would seem, this is what Scott is intended to do. At
least since Green, the double jeopardy clause has been seen as
the expression of "society's . . . willingness to limit the Gov-
ernment to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very
vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws"84 because of the
recognition of the gross unfairness of requiring the accused to
undergo the strain and agony of more than one trial for any
single offense. But the majority in Scott minimized this tradi-
tion and concluded that "the primary purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause . . . [is] to protect the integrity of a final
judgment. . . ."I Their insistence on a true acquittal follows,
and the right of the defendant to avoid multiple prosecutions
is then easily subordinated to the rights of the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
In framing its opinion, the Court in Scott had before it two
seemingly overlapping but, in fact, divergent bodies of law. On
one hand was the position of Blackstone and of English law
which held that nothing short of a final judgment would bar
further prosecution. Lacking such final judgment, appeal
which may result in a second trial was not barred. In stark
82. Id. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. The majority's restrictive definition of "acquittal" is the focal point of Justice
Brennan's dissent, in which he contends that the term's definition "is incapable of
principled application." In his criticism of the majority's definition of acquittal, he
stated that "in terms of the practical operation of the adversary process, there is
actually no difference between a so-called 'true acquittal' and the termination in this
case favorably to respondent." Id. at 104.
84. 400 U.S. at 479.
85. 437 U.S. at 92.
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contrast is the double jeopardy clause itself with its protections
against multiple prosecutions. Scott has the effect of substan-
tially narrowing the scope of such double jeopardy protections,
shifting this scope more closely to the position of English law.
LARRY L. SHUPE
INSURANCE-Subrogation-Accident and Health Insur-
ance Policy Still Characterized as "Investment" Contract.
Rixmann v. Somerset Public Schools, 83 Wis. 2d 571, 266
N.W.2d 326 (1978). In the recent decision of Rixmann v. So-
merset Public Schools' the Wisconsin Supreme Court at-
tempted to eliminate some of the confusion that has sur-
rounded the subrogation and collateral source rules in Wiscon-
sin ever since the Delphic case of Heifetz v. Johnson.2 The
Rixmann decision purports to establish simple rules for the
treatment of payments under accident and health insurance
policies in personal injury cases. It is submitted, however, that
the decision's continued characterization of such insurance
policies as "investment" contracts, for which there is no auto-
matic subrogation, does not reflect changes that have taken
place since the issue was originally decided.
The plaintiffs, Ronald Rixmann and his father, brought an
action for damages from injuries Ronald suffered while partici-
pating in a high school chemistry class experiment. They had
been reimbursed for all but $656.33 of Ronald's medical expen-
ses by his father's health insurer, Guardian Life Insurance
Company. However, Guardian Life had executed a document
purporting to assign any interest it had from payments under
the policy back to the plaintiffs.
The trial court had ruled that Guardian Life was not subro-
gated as a result of its payments and, therefore, had no interest
to assign to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the trial court had held
that the plaintiffs could not recover expenses for which they
had been reimbursed.' Both rulings were contested on appeal.
With respect to the first ruling, the plaintiffs argued that
1. 83 Wis. 2d 571, 266 N.W.2d 326 (1978).
2. 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
3. 83 Wis. 2d at 574, 266 N.W.2d at 328.
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